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Random paths to stability in three-sided
matching with cyclic preferences
Yusuke Samejima
Abstract
We investigate the three-sided matching model with cyclic preferences: there are three equinumerous disjoint
sets of agents, N1, N2, and N3, and each agent a ∈ Nn has a strict preference relation over Nn+1 ∪ {a} with
himself ranked last on his preference list. We show that, starting from an arbitrary unstable matching, there
exists a finite sequence of successive blockings leading to a stable matching for a three-sided matching problem
with cyclic preferences. The result implies that a decentralized process of successive blockings by randomly
chosen blocking agents will converge to a stable matching with probability one. When |Nn| ≤ 5, the result
applies for any problem. When |Nn| = 6, the result applies for any problem for which there exists a stable
matching.
1. Introduction
The three-sided matching model with cyclic preferences, or equivalently the three-sided cyclic matching
model, is described as follows. There are three disjoint sets of agents: N1, N2, and N3 with |N1| =
|N2| = |N3|. The set of all agents is denoted by N ≡ N1∪N2∪N3. The word cyclic is used because the
way how agents have preference relations exhibits a cycle: each agent a ∈ Nn has a strict preference
relation over Nn+1 ∪ {a} where Nn+1 is interpreted as N1 when n = 3. A matching is a bijection
µ : N → N such that, for any a ∈ Nn, we have µ(a) ∈ Nn+1 ∪ {a} and µ(µ(µ(a))) = a. If µ(a) ̸= a,
agent a is matched at the matching µ. If µ(a) = a, agent a is single at the matching µ.
The major difference between the three-sided cyclic matching model and the three-sided matching
model as described in Alkan [1988] and in Danilov [2003] is the way how agents have preference relations.
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In the latter three-sided matching model, each agent a ∈ Nn has a strict preference relation over
Nn+1×Nn+2 ∪ {a}. So, each agent cares both of his partners in the three-sided matching model while
each agent cares only one of his partners in the three-sided cyclic matching model.
Both of the models described above are extensions of the two-sided matching model analyzed by
Gale and Shapley [1962]. In the two-sided matching model, there are two kinds of agents, men and
women. The sets of men and women are denoted by M and W , respectively. Each agent has a strict
preference relation over agents of the opposite sex. A matching is a bijection µ : M ∪W → M ∪W
such that, for any a ∈ M , we have µ(a) ∈ W ∪ {a} and µ(µ(a)) = a, and for any a ∈ W , we have
µ(a) ∈M ∪ {a} and µ(µ(a)) = a. So, the two-sided matching model can be regarded as the two-sided
cyclic matching model.
Stability has been a key research topic in the field of matching theory. In the two-sided matching
model, a matching µ is blocked by a single agent if he prefers being single to being matched to his
partner at µ. A matching µ is also blocked by a pair of a man and a woman (m,w) ∈ M ×W if they
prefer each other to their own partners at µ. A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any single
agent or any pair of agents. Gale and Shapley [1962] proved the existence of a stable matching for any
two-sided matching problem by presenting an algorithm for finding a stable matching.
As for the three-sided matching model in general, a stable matching does not necessarily exist as
Alkan [1988] presented an example. However, if we restrict preference domains of agents in a certain
way, there is a possibility that there exists a stable matching for a three-sided matching problem as
Danilov [2003] showed. He considered the following restrictions on preference domains. Each agent in
N1 is more interested in agents in N2 than in agents in N3 while each agent in N2 is more interested in
agents in N1 than in agents in N3. Danilov [2003] presented an algorithm for finding a stable matching
for any three-sided matching problem with these restricted preference domains.
Stability has been studied also in the three-sided cyclic matching model. As Biro and McDer-
mid [2010] showed an example with |Nn| = 6, a stable matching does not necessarily exist in the
three-sided cyclic matching model if there exist some agents who do not rank themselves last on their
preference lists, that is, if there exist agents in Nn such that each of them prefers being single to being
matched to an unacceptable agent in Nn+1.
On the other hand, some researchers have studied stability in the three-sided cyclic matching model,
focusing on the case where each agent ranks himself last on his preference list. Boros et al. [2004]
proved the existence of a stable matching for the case |Nn| ≤ 3. Eriksson et al. [2006] proved the
existence for the case |Nn| = 4. Furthermore, based on computer search, Eriksson et al. [2006] stated
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a conjecture that there were at least two stable matchings for any three-sided cyclic matching problem
when |Nn| ≥ 2. Woeginger [2013] stated that proving the existence of a stable matching for any three-
sided cyclic matching problem was an open problem. Pashkovich and Poirrier [2018] demonstrated that
at least two distinct stable matchings exist for the case |Nn| = 5. So, the conjecture made by Eriksson
et al. [2006] seemed promising. However, Lam and Plaxton [2019] showed that, by utilizing the example
with |Nn| = 6 presented by Biro and McDermid [2010], a stable matching does not necessarily exist in
the three-sided cyclic matching model even if each agent ranks himself last on his preference list. Their
result indicates that a stable matching does not exist for some three-sided cyclic matching problems
when |Nn| ≥ 6.
Another key research topic in the field of matching theory is an investigation of random paths to
a stable matching. The question here is whether decentralized decision making by each agent leads
to stability. This question was answered by Roth and Vande Vate [1990] for the two-sided matching
model. They proved that, starting from an arbitrary unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence
of successive blockings leading to a stable matching. Their result implies that a decentralized process
of successive blockings by randomly chosen blocking agents will converge to a stable matching with
probability one. The same question was answered by Samejima [2018] for the three-sided matching
model with the restricted preference domains considered by Danilov [2003].
In the present paper, we investigate random paths to a stable matching in the three-sided cyclic
matching model for the case where each agent ranks himself last on his preference list. However, as we
have noted, the existence of a stable matching for the case |Nn| ≥ 6 is not guaranteed; a problem may or
may not have a stable matching, depending on the preference relations that agents have. So, we focus
on a three-sided cyclic matching problem such that, given the preferences of agents, a stable matching
exists for the problem itself and for any problem constructed of a subset of the set of all agents. We
investigate paths to stability for such a problem. We prove that, starting from an arbitrary unstable
matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive blockings leading to a stable matching. Our result
implies the following. When |Nn| ≤ 5, a decentralized process of successive blockings by randomly
chosen blocking agents will converge to a stable matching with probability one for any problem. When
|Nn| = 6, such successive random blockings will lead to stability for any problem for which there exists
a stable matching.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains a model of three-sided
cyclic matching model. Section 3 shows our main result. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
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2. Preliminaries
There are three disjoint sets of agents: N1, N2, and N3. For each agent a ∈ Nn with n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Nn
represents agent a’s gender. We assume that |N1| = |N2| = |N3|. So, each of these sets contains the
same number of agents. We denote each of these sets by Nn with n = 1, 2, or 3. When n = 2, Nn+2 is
interpreted as N1. When n = 3, Nn+1 and Nn+2 are interpreted as N1 and N2, respectively. The set
of all agents is denoted by N ≡ N1 ∪N2 ∪N3.
For any n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, each agent a ∈ Nn has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation
a over Nn+1 ∪ {a}. When a prefers b ∈ Nn+1 ∪ {a} to b′ ∈ Nn+1 ∪ {a}, we write b ≻a b′. When a
weakly prefers b to b′, that is, b is at least as good as b′ for a, we write b a b′. We assume that each
agent ranks himself last on his preference list. That is, for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a ∈ Nn, and b ∈ Nn+1, we
have b ≻a a.
Definition. A matching is a bijection µ : N → N such that for any n ∈ {1, 2, 3} and a ∈ Nn, we
have
(i) µ(a) ∈ Nn+1 ∪ {a}, and
(ii) µ(µ(µ(a))) = a.
We say that a ∈ N is single at µ if µ(a) = a while a ∈ N is matched at µ if µ(a) ̸= a. The set
of single agents at µ is denoted by S(µ) ≡ {a ∈ N : µ(a) = a} while the set of matched agents at
µ is denoted by T (µ) ≡ {a ∈ N : µ(a) ̸= a}. We also say that a triplet (a, b, c) is matched at µ if
(a, b, c) ∈ Nn × Nn+1 × Nn+2 for some n ∈ {1, 2, 3} and we have µ(a) = b, µ(b) = c, and µ(c) = a.
When (a, b, c) is matched at µ, we write (a, b, c) ∈ µ by abuse of notation, and we say that b and c are
partners of a at µ. In this case, we also say that c and a are partners of b at µ as well as a and b are
partners of c at µ.
A three-sided matching problem with cyclic preferences, or equivalently a three-sided cyclic matching
problem, is specified by (N, (a)a∈N ).
We now define stability of a matching. A triplet (a, b, c) is called a blocking triplet for µ if (a, b, c) ∈
Nn×Nn+1×Nn+2 for some n ∈ {1, 2, 3} and we have b ≻a µ(a), c ≻b µ(b), and a ≻c µ(c). A matching
µ is individually rational if µ(a) a a for all a ∈ N .
Definition. A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and there is no blocking triplet for
µ.
Since we assume that each agent ranks himself last on his preference list, any matching is individ-
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ually rational in the present paper. Furthermore, no agent is single at a stable matching due to our
assumption that |N1| = |N2| = |N3|. In other words, if some agents are single at a matching, then the
matching is unstable.
3. The Result
This section investigates whether, starting from an arbitrary unstable matching, there exists a finite
sequence of successive blockings leading to a stable matching on condition that there exists a stable
matching in the three-sided cyclic matching model.
Suppose that a triplet (a, b, c) is a blocking triplet for µ. We say that another matching µ′ is
obtained from µ by satisfying the blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µ if the following three conditions hold.
(i) We have (a, b, c) ∈ µ′.
(ii) For any i ∈ {a, b, c}, if µ(i) = j ̸= i or µ(j) = i ̸= j then µ′(j) = j.
(iii) If i /∈ {a, b, c, µ(a), µ(b), µ(c)} or µ(i) /∈ {a, b, c} then µ′(i) = µ(i).
Condition (i) says that the blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µ is newly matched at µ′. Condition (ii) says
that the partners of a, b, and c at µ become single at µ′. Condition (iii) says that agents irrelevant to
(a, b, c) at µ are unaffected even when µ′ is obtained from µ.
Theorem. Let µ1 be an arbitrary unstable matching for a three-sided cyclic matching problem,
which is specified by (N, (a)a∈N ) with N ≡ N1 ∪N2 ∪N3 and |Nn| = |N |/3 for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Suppose
that for any N¯1 ⊂ N1, N¯2 ⊂ N2, and N¯3 ⊂ N3 with |N¯1| = |N¯2| = |N¯3|, there exists a stable matching
for the problem (N¯ , (a)a∈N¯ ) with N¯ ≡ N¯1 ∪ N¯2 ∪ N¯3.1 Then, there exists a finite sequence µ1, . . . , µL
of matchings for the problem (N, (a)a∈N ) such that µL is stable, and for each ℓ = 1, . . . , L− 1, there
is a blocking triplet for µℓ such that µℓ+1 is obtained from µℓ by satisfying the blocking triplet.
Proof. At the beginning, we have an unstable matching µ1.
Step 1. Suppose that S(µ1) = N . That is, all agents are single at µ1. If this is not the case, then
we proceed to step 2. Otherwise, we go through the following procedure.
Let µ∗ be a stable matching for the problem (N, (a)a∈N ) and let {(aℓ, bℓ, cℓ)}|N|/3ℓ=1 be the collection
of triplets that are matched at µ∗, i.e., (aℓ, bℓ, cℓ) ∈ µ∗ for ℓ = 1, . . . , |N |/3. We now obtain a sequence
of matchings µ1, . . . , µ|N/3|+1 = µ
∗ such that for each ℓ = 1, . . . , |N |/3, we obtain µℓ+1 from µℓ by
1When we consider the problem (N¯, (a)a∈N¯ ), we must note that the preference relation of agent a ∈ N¯n,
a, is defined over not N¯n+1∪{a} but Nn+1∪{a}. However, we use a for the specification of the problem since
the preference relation over N¯n+1 ∪ {a} can be directly induced from the preference relation over Nn+1 ∪ {a}.
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satisfying the blocking triplet (aℓ, bℓ, cℓ). We note that (aℓ, bℓ, cℓ) is in fact a blocking triplet for µℓ
since aℓ, bℓ, and cℓ are single at µℓ.
At the end of step 1, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings mentioned in the
theorem.
Step 2. Let µℓ be the unstable matching that we have at the beginning of this step. Let |T (µℓ)|
be the number of matched agents at µℓ. Note that, whenever step 2 is reached, |T (µℓ)| ≥ 3 and it is
clear that |T (µℓ)| is a multiple of three.
As we will see, we may return to step 2 after we go through subsequent steps such as steps 3, 4, 7,
and 8. So, we may be in a loop, but this loop is not infinite because every time we return to step 2,
the number of matched agents |T (µℓ)| ≥ 3 is smaller than before.
We now proceed to step 3.
Step 3. Suppose that there exists a blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ such that a ∈ T (µℓ), b ∈ T (µℓ),
and c ∈ T (µℓ), that is, these three agents are not single at µℓ.2 If there does not exist such a blocking
triplet, then we proceed to step 4. Otherwise, we go through the following procedure.
We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ. We note
that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)|− 6 since the partners of a, b, and c at µℓ become single at µℓ+1. We also note
that µℓ+1 is unstable since some agents are single at µℓ+1. We now return to step 2 with the unstable
matching µℓ+1 with the smaller number of matched agents |T (µℓ+1)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Step 4. Suppose that there exists a blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ such that a ∈ S(µℓ), b ∈ T (µℓ),
and c ∈ T (µℓ), that is, one of these agents is single and the other two agents are not single at µℓ.3 If
there does not exist such a blocking triplet, then we proceed to step 5. Otherwise, we go through the
following procedure.
We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ. We note
that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| − 3 since the partners of b and c at µℓ become single at µℓ+1 and the formerly
single agent a gets matched at µℓ+1. We also note that µℓ+1 is unstable since some agents are single at
µℓ+1. We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+1 with the smaller number of matched
agents |T (µℓ+1)| < |T (µℓ)|.
2We note that these three agents are not partners of each other at µℓ because, if so, they cannot form the
blocking triplet for µℓ since every agent in the blocking triplet should be matched to a more preferred agent
after blocking. Therefore, if there exists the blocking triplet for µℓ as described in step 3, it must be the case
that |T (µℓ)| ≥ 9.
3If there exists the blocking triplet for µℓ as described in step 4, it must be the case that |T (µℓ)| ≥ 6.
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Step 5. We first note that |S(µℓ)| is a multiple of three since both |N | and |T (µℓ)| are multiples
of three. We also note that, whenever step 5 is reached, |S(µℓ)| ≥ 3. This is because, if |S(µℓ)| = 0
at the beginning of step 5, the fact that we went through step 3 implies that there exists no blocking
triplet for µℓ, which is in contradiction with the instability of µℓ assumed at the beginning of step 2.
If |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6, then we proceed to step 6. If |S(µℓ)| = 3, then we go through the following procedure.
Let S(µℓ) be such that S(µℓ) = {a, b, c} for which (a, b, c) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3. We note that (a, b, c)
is in fact a blocking triplet for µℓ since a, b, and c are single at µℓ. We now obtain another matching
µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ.
We claim that µℓ+1 is a stable matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a
blocking triplet (a′, b′, c′) for µℓ+1. Since we went through steps 3 and 4 before reaching step 5, it
must be the case that one member of {a′, b′, c′} is in T (µℓ) and the other two members are in S(µℓ).
However, the two members in S(µℓ) are partners of each other at µℓ+1 and hence they cannot form
the blocking triplet for µℓ+1 since every agent in the blocking triplet should be matched to a more
preferred agent after blocking. A contradiction obtains.
At the end of step 5, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings mentioned in the
theorem.
Step 6. Suppose that there does not exist a blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ such that a ∈ T (µℓ),
b ∈ S(µℓ), and c ∈ S(µℓ), that is, one of these agents is matched and the other two agents are single
at µℓ. If there exists such a blocking triplet, then we proceed to step 7. Otherwise, we go through the
following procedure.
Let µ¯∗ be a stable matching for the problem (S(µℓ), (a)a∈S(µℓ)) and let {(ak, bk, ck)}|S(µℓ)|/3k=1 be
the collection of triplets that are matched at µ¯∗, i.e., (ak, bk, ck) ∈ µ¯∗ for k = 1, . . . , |S(µℓ)|/3. We now
obtain a sequence of matchings µℓ, . . . , µℓ+|S(µℓ)|/3 for the problem (N, (a)a∈N ) such that for each
k = 1, . . . , |S(µℓ)|/3, we obtain µℓ+k from µℓ+k−1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (ak, bk, ck). We
note that (ak, bk, ck) is in fact a blocking triplet for µℓ+k−1 since ak, bk, and ck are single at µℓ+k−1.
We claim that µℓ+|S(µℓ)|/3 is a stable matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there
exists a blocking triplet (a′, b′, c′) for µℓ+|S(µℓ)|/3. Since we went through steps 3 and 4 before reaching
step 6, and since we did not proceed to step 7 at the beginning of step 6, it must be the case that all
members of {a′, b′, c′} are in S(µℓ). Then, (a′, b′, c′) must be a blocking triplet for µ¯∗ for the problem
(S(µℓ), (a)a∈S(µℓ)), which is in contradiction with the stability of µ¯
∗.
At the end of step 6, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings mentioned in the
7
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theorem.
Step 7. We note that, whenever step 7 is reached, |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6 since we went through step 5. We
also note that, since we went through step 6, there exists a blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ such that
a ∈ T (µℓ), b ∈ S(µℓ), and c ∈ S(µℓ), that is, one of these agents is matched and the other two agents
are single at µℓ. We now investigate whether there exists another blocking triplet (d, e, f) for µℓ such
that d ∈ T (µℓ) \ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))}, e ∈ S(µℓ), and f ∈ S(µℓ). If there does not exist such a triplet
(d, e, f) described above, then we proceed to step 8. Otherwise, one of the following three cases must
apply. These three cases are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Case 7–1. Agents a and d are in different genders.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that (a, b, c) = (a1, b1, c1) ∈ N1×N2×N3 and (e, f, d) =
(a2, b2, c2) ∈ N1×N2×N3. We note that a1 ̸= a2 and c1 ̸= c2. We consider the following two subcases.
Subcase 7–1–1. We have c2 ≻b1 c1.
We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b1, c1) for µℓ. We note
that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since the partners of a1 at µℓ become single at µℓ+1 while the formerly single
agents b1 and c1 get matched at µℓ+1.
We claim that (a2, b1, c2) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1. This is because a2 is single at µℓ+1 while
b1 and c2 prefer c2 and a2 to µℓ+1(b1) = c1 and µℓ+1(c2) = µℓ(c2), respectively. We next obtain
another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a2, b1, c2) for µℓ+1. We note that |T (µℓ+2)| =
|T (µℓ+1)|−3 since a1, c1, and the partners of c2 at µℓ+1 become single at µℓ+2 while the formerly single
agent a2 gets matched at µℓ+2. We also note that µℓ+2 is unstable since some agents are single at µℓ+2.
We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+2 with the smaller number of matched agents
|T (µℓ+2)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Subcase 7–1–2. We have c1 ≻b1 c2.
We note that (a2, b1, c2) is a blocking triplet for µℓ. This is because a2 and b1 are single at µℓ
while c2 prefers a2 to µℓ(c2). We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet
(a2, b1, c2) for µℓ. We note that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since the partners of c2 at µℓ become single at
µℓ+1 while the formerly single agents a2 and b1 get matched at µℓ+1.
We claim that (a1, b1, c1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1. This is because c1 is single at µℓ+1 while
a1 and b1 prefer b1 and c1 to µℓ+1(a1) = µℓ(a1) and µℓ+1(b1) = c2, respectively. We next obtain
another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b1, c1) for µℓ+1. We note that |T (µℓ+2)| =
|T (µℓ+1)| − 3 since a2, c2, and the partners of a1 at µℓ+1 become single at µℓ+2 while the formerly
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single agent c1 gets matched at µℓ+2. We also note that µℓ+2 is unstable since some agents are single at
µℓ+2. We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+2 with the smaller number of matched
agents |T (µℓ+2)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Case 7–2. Agents a and d are in the same gender and b ̸= e.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that (a, b, c) = (a1, b1, c1) ∈ N1×N2×N3 and (d, e, f) =
(a2, b2, c2) ∈ N1×N2×N3. We note that a1 ̸= a2 and b1 ̸= b2. We consider the following two subcases.
Subcase 7–2–1. We have a2 ≻c1 a1.
We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b1, c1) for µℓ. We note
that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since the partners of a1 at µℓ become single at µℓ+1 while the formerly single
agents b1 and c1 get matched at µℓ+1.
We claim that (a2, b2, c1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1. This is because b2 is single at µℓ+1 while
a2 and c1 prefer b2 and a2 to µℓ+1(a2) = µℓ(a2) and µℓ+1(c1) = a1, respectively. We next obtain
another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a2, b2, c1) for µℓ+1. We note that |T (µℓ+2)| =
|T (µℓ+1)| − 3 since a1, b1, and the partners of a2 at µℓ+1 become single at µℓ+2 while the formerly
single agent b2 gets matched at µℓ+2. We also note that µℓ+2 is unstable since some agents are single at
µℓ+2. We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+2 with the smaller number of matched
agents |T (µℓ+2)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Subcase 7–2–2. We have a1 ≻c1 a2.
We note that (a2, b2, c1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ. This is because b2 and c1 are single at µℓ
while a2 prefers b2 to µℓ(a2). We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet
(a2, b2, c1) for µℓ. We note that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since the partners of a2 at µℓ become single at
µℓ+1 while the formerly single agents b2 and c1 get matched at µℓ+1.
We claim that (a1, b1, c1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1. This is because b1 is single at µℓ+1 while
a1 and c1 prefer b1 and a1 to µℓ+1(a1) = µℓ(a1) and µℓ+1(c1) = a2, respectively. We next obtain
another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b1, c1) for µℓ+1. We note that |T (µℓ+2)| =
|T (µℓ+1)| − 3 since a2, b2, and the partners of a1 at µℓ+1 become single at µℓ+2 while the formerly
single agent b1 gets matched at µℓ+2. We also note that µℓ+2 is unstable since some agents are single at
µℓ+2. We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+2 with the smaller number of matched
agents |T (µℓ+2)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Case 7–3. Agents a and d are in the same gender and b = e.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that (a, b, c) = (a1, b1, c1) ∈ N1×N2×N3 and (d, e, f) =
(a2, b1, c2) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3. We note that a1 ̸= a2. Since we went through step 5, we have |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6
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and hence there exists c3 ∈ N3 ∩ S(µℓ) such that c3 ̸= c1.4 We consider the following two subcases.
Subcase 7–3–1. We have c3 ≻b1 c1.
We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b1, c1) for µℓ. We note
that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since the partners of a1 at µℓ become single at µℓ+1 while the formerly single
agents b1 and c1 get matched at µℓ+1.
We claim that (a2, b1, c3) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1. This is because c3 is single at µℓ+1 while
a2 and b1 prefer b1 and c3 to µℓ+1(a2) = µℓ(a2) and µℓ+1(b1) = c1, respectively. We next obtain
another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a2, b1, c3) for µℓ+1. We note that |T (µℓ+2)| =
|T (µℓ+1)| − 3 since a1, c1, and the partners of a2 at µℓ+1 become single at µℓ+2 while the formerly
single agent c3 gets matched at µℓ+2. We also note that µℓ+2 is unstable since some agents are single at
µℓ+2. We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+2 with the smaller number of matched
agents |T (µℓ+2)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Subcase 7–3–2. We have c1 ≻b1 c3.
We note that (a2, b1, c3) is a blocking triplet for µℓ. This is because b1 and c3 are single at µℓ
while a2 prefers b1 to µℓ(a2). We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet
(a2, b1, c3) for µℓ. We note that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since the partners of a2 at µℓ become single at
µℓ+1 while the formerly single agents b1 and c3 get matched at µℓ+1.
We claim that (a1, b1, c1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1. This is because c1 is single at µℓ+1 while
a1 and b1 prefer b1 and c1 to µℓ+1(a1) = µℓ(a1) and µℓ+1(b1) = c3, respectively. We next obtain
another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b1, c1) for µℓ+1. We note that |T (µℓ+2)| =
|T (µℓ+1)| − 3 since a2, c3, and the partners of a1 at µℓ+1 become single at µℓ+2 while the formerly
single agent c1 gets matched at µℓ+2. We also note that µℓ+2 is unstable since some agents are single at
µℓ+2. We now return to step 2 with the unstable matching µℓ+2 with the smaller number of matched
agents |T (µℓ+2)| < |T (µℓ)|.
Step 8. We note that, whenever step 8 is reached, |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6 since we went through step 5. We also
note that, since we went through steps 6 and 7, there exists a blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ such that
a ∈ T (µℓ), b ∈ S(µℓ), and c ∈ S(µℓ), but there does not exist another blocking triplet (d, e, f) for µℓ such
that d ∈ T (µℓ)\{a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))}, e ∈ S(µℓ), and f ∈ S(µℓ). We now investigate whether there exists
a pair of agents (i, j) such that i ∈ T (µℓ) \ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))} and j ∈ S(µℓ) ∪ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))}
and j ≻i µℓ(i). If there does not exist the pair (i, j) described above, then we proceed to step 9.
4It is possible that c3 = c2, but even so, it does not affect our argument.
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Otherwise, one of the following four cases must apply. These four cases are mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive.
Case 8–1. j ∈ S(µℓ).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that (i, j) ∈ N1 × N2. Choose any h ∈ N3 ∩ S(µℓ).
We note that (i, j, h) is a blocking triplet for µℓ. This is because j and h are single at µℓ while i
prefers j to µℓ(i). However, the existence of the blocking triplet (i, j, h) for µℓ is in contradiction with
the assumption of the non-existence of the triplet (d, e, f) described above. Therefore, this case never
applies.
Case 8–2. j = a.
We note that (i, j, b) is a blocking triplet for µℓ. This is because b is single at µℓ while i and j = a
prefer j and b to µℓ(i) and µℓ(a), respectively. We also note that the triplet (i, j, b) ∈ T (µℓ)× T (µℓ)×
S(µℓ) is such that one of these agents is single and the other two agents are not single at µℓ. However,
the existence of the blocking triplet (i, j, b) for µℓ is in contradiction with the fact that we went through
step 4 and proceeded to step 5 before reaching step 8. Therefore, this case never applies.
Case 8–3. j = µℓ(a).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that (a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))) = (a1, b1, c1) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3,
(a, b, c) = (a1, b2, c2) ∈ N1×N2×N3, and (i, j) = (a0, b1) ∈ N1×N2. Since |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6, we can choose
any c3 ∈ N3 ∩ S(µℓ) such that c3 ̸= c2. We note that (a1, b2, c3) as well as (a1, b2, c2) is a blocking
triplet for µℓ. This is because b2, c3, and c2 are single at µℓ while a1 prefers b2 to µℓ(a1) = b1.
Without loss of generality, suppose that c2 ≻b2 c3. We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by
satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c3) for µℓ. We note that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since b1 and c1,
who are the partners of a1 at µℓ, become single at µℓ+1 while the formerly single agents b2 and c3 get
matched at µℓ+1. Consequently, |S(µℓ+1)| = |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6. Choose any a2 ∈ N1∩S(µℓ+1). We note that
(a0, b1, c1) ∈ T (µℓ+1) × S(µℓ+1) × S(µℓ+1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1 since a0 = i prefers b1 = j to
µℓ+1(a0) = µℓ(a0). We also note that (b2, c2, a2) ∈ T (µℓ+1) × S(µℓ+1) × S(µℓ+1) is a blocking triplet
for µℓ+1 since b2 prefers c2 to µℓ+1(b2) = c3. We now go through the same procedure as step 7 with the
unstable matching µℓ+1. Then, case 7–1 applies and eventually we will return to step 2 with another
unstable matching with the smaller number of matched agents.
Case 8–4. j = µℓ(µℓ(a)).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that (a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))) = (a1, b1, c1) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3,
(a, b, c) = (a1, b2, c2) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3, and (i, j) = (b0, c1) ∈ N2 ×N3. Since |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6, we can choose
any c3 ∈ N3 ∩ S(µℓ) such that c3 ̸= c2. We note that (a1, b2, c3) as well as (a1, b2, c2) is a blocking
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triplet for µℓ. This is because b2, c3, and c2 are single at µℓ while a1 prefers b2 to µℓ(a1) = b1.
Without loss of generality, suppose that c2 ≻b2 c3. We first obtain another matching µℓ+1 by
satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c3) for µℓ. We note that |T (µℓ+1)| = |T (µℓ)| since b1 and c1, who
are the partners of a1 at µℓ, become single at µℓ+1 while the formerly single agents b2 and c3 get matched
at µℓ+1. Consequently, |S(µℓ+1)| = |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6. Choose any two different agents a2, a3 ∈ N1∩S(µℓ+1).
We note that (b0, c1, a3) ∈ T (µℓ+1)×S(µℓ+1)×S(µℓ+1) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1 since b0 = i prefers
c1 = j to µℓ+1(b0) = µℓ(b0). We also note that (b2, c2, a2) ∈ T (µℓ+1)×S(µℓ+1)×S(µℓ+1) is a blocking
triplet for µℓ+1 since b2 prefers c2 to µℓ+1(b2) = c3. We now go through the same procedure as step 7
with the unstable matching µℓ+1. Then, case 7–2 applies and eventually we will return to step 2 with
another unstable matching with the smaller number of matched agents.
Step 9. We note that, whenever step 9 is reached, |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6 since we went through step 5.
We also note that, since we went through steps 6 and 7, there exists a blocking triplet (a, b, c) for µℓ
such that a ∈ T (µℓ), b ∈ S(µℓ), and c ∈ S(µℓ). Furthermore, since we went through step 8, for any
i ∈ T (µℓ) \ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))} and j ∈ S(µℓ) ∪ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))}, we have µℓ(i) ≻i j.
Let us define N˜ and Nˆ by N˜ ≡ T (µℓ) \ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))} and Nˆ ≡ S(µℓ)∪ {a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))},
respectively. Without loss of generality, we may assume that (a, µℓ(a), µℓ(µℓ(a))) = (a1, b1, c1) ∈
N1 × N2 × N3 and (a, b, c) = (a1, b2, c2) ∈ N1 × N2 × N3. Let µˆ∗ be a stable matching for the
problem (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ) and let {(aˆk, bˆk, cˆk)}|Nˆ|/3k=1 be the collection of triplets that are matched at µˆ∗,
i.e., (aˆk, bˆk, cˆk) ∈ µˆ∗ for k = 1, . . . , |Nˆ |/3. We now consider the following six cases. These six cases are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Case 9–1. b1 = µˆ
∗(a1) and c1 = µˆ∗(b1).
In this case, we must have a1 = µˆ
∗(c1) and (a1, b1, c1) ∈ µˆ∗. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that (a1, b1, c1) = (aˆ1, bˆ1, cˆ1). We now obtain a sequence of matchings µℓ, . . . , µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1 for
the problem (N, (a)a∈N ) such that for each k = 1, . . . , |Nˆ |/3 − 1, we obtain µℓ+k from µℓ+k−1 by
satisfying the blocking triplet (aˆk+1, bˆk+1, cˆk+1). We note that (aˆk+1, bˆk+1, cˆk+1) is in fact a blocking
triplet for µℓ+k−1 since aˆk+1, bˆk+1, and cˆk+1 are single at µℓ+k−1.
We claim that µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1 is a stable matching. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists
a blocking triplet (a′, b′, c′) for µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1.
Since µˆ∗ is a stable matching for the problem (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ), it cannot be the case that {a′, b′, c′} ⊂
Nˆ . This is because, considering the fact that µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1(i) = µˆ
∗(i) for all i ∈ Nˆ , if {a′, b′, c′} ⊂ Nˆ then
the triplet (a′, b′, c′) is a blocking triplet for µˆ∗ for the problem (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ), which is in contradiction
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with the stability of µˆ∗.
Since we went through step 3 before reaching step 9, it cannot be the case that {a′, b′, c′} ⊂ N˜ .
This is because, considering the fact that µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1(i) = µℓ(i) for all i ∈ N˜ , if {a′, b′, c′} ⊂ N˜ then
the triplet (a′, b′, c′) is a blocking triplet for µℓ such that a′ ∈ T (µℓ), b′ ∈ T (µℓ), and c′ ∈ T (µℓ). The
existence of the blocking triplet (a′, b′, c′) is in contradiction with the fact that we proceeded to step 4.
Therefore, it must be the case that there exists a pair of agents (i, j) ∈ Nn × Nn+1 for some
n ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that i ∈ {a′, b′, c′} ∩ N˜ and j ∈ {a′, b′, c′} ∩ Nˆ . Without loss of generality, we may
assume that (i, j) = (a′, b′). Since we went through step 8 before reaching step 9, we have µℓ(a′) ≻a′ b′.
Furthermore, since a′ ∈ N˜ and hence µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1(a′) = µℓ(a′), we have µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1(a′) ≻a′ b′, which is
in contradiction with the assumption that (a′, b′, c′) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+|Nˆ|/3−1.
Hence, at the end of case 9–1, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings mentioned
in the theorem.
Case 9–2. b1 ̸= µˆ∗(a1) and c1 ̸= µˆ∗(b1) and a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c1).
We claim that there exists h ∈ {a1, b1, c1} such that µˆ∗(h) ≻h µℓ(h). Suppose, by way of contradic-
tion, that µℓ(a1) ≻a1 µˆ∗(a1) and µℓ(b1) ≻b1 µˆ∗(b1) and µℓ(c1) ≻c1 µˆ∗(c1). Since (µℓ(c1), µℓ(a1), µℓ(b1)) =
(a1, b1, c1), the triplet (a1, b1, c1) is a blocking triplet for µˆ
∗ for the problem (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ), which is in
contradiction with the stability of µˆ∗.
Having proved the claim, we may assume that h = a1, that is, µˆ
∗(a1) ≻a1 µℓ(a1) without loss of
generality. For notational convenience, we denote (a1, µˆ
∗(a1), µˆ∗(µˆ∗(a1))) by (a1, b3, c3).
Since Nˆ = S(µℓ) ∪ {a1, b1, c1} and b3 ∈ N2 ∩ Nˆ and b3 ̸= b1, we have b3 ∈ S(µℓ). We also note
that c3 ∈ S(µℓ). This is because, if c3 /∈ S(µℓ) and hence c3 = c1, we have µˆ∗(c1) = µˆ∗(c3) =
µˆ∗(µˆ∗(µˆ∗(a1))) = a1, which is in contradiction with the assumption a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c1) in case 9–2.
We note that (a1, b3, c3) is a blocking triplet for µℓ since b3 ≻a1 µℓ(a1), and b3 and c3 are single at
µℓ. We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b3, c3) for µℓ.
Considering the fact that Nˆ = S(µℓ+1)∪{a1, b3, c3} and (a1, b3, c3) ∈ µˆ∗, we can apply the same ar-
gument to the matching µℓ+1 as the one applied to the matching µℓ in case 9–1. That is, we may assume
that (a1, b3, c3) = (aˆ1, bˆ1, cˆ1) without loss, and we obtain a sequence of matchings µℓ+1, . . . , µℓ+|Nˆ|/3,
where µℓ+|Nˆ|/3 is stable.
Hence, at the end of case 9–2, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings mentioned
in the theorem.
Case 9–3. Cases 9–1 and 9–2 do not apply, but the following conditions hold: b2 = µˆ
∗(a1) and
there exists c′ ∈ S(µℓ) such that c′ = µˆ∗(b2).
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We note that (a1, b2, c
′) is a blocking triplet for µℓ since b2 ≻a1 µℓ(a1), and b2 and c′ are single at
µℓ. We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c
′) for µℓ.
Considering the fact that Nˆ = S(µℓ+1)∪{a1, b2, c′} and (a1, b2, c′) ∈ µˆ∗, we can apply the same ar-
gument to the matching µℓ+1 as the one applied to the matching µℓ in case 9–1. That is, we may assume
that (a1, b2, c
′) = (aˆ1, bˆ1, cˆ1) without loss, and we obtain a sequence of matchings µℓ+1, . . . , µℓ+|Nˆ|/3,
where µℓ+|Nˆ|/3 is stable.
Hence, at the end of case 9–3, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings mentioned
in the theorem.
Case 9–4. Cases 9–1 and 9–2 do not apply, but the following conditions hold: b2 = µˆ
∗(a1) and
there does not exist c′ ∈ S(µℓ) such that c′ = µˆ∗(b2).
Since Nˆ = S(µℓ) ∪ {a1, b1, c1} and µˆ∗(b2) ∈ N3 ∩ Nˆ and µˆ∗(b2) /∈ S(µℓ), we have µˆ∗(b2) = c1.
Since |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6, at least two agents are single in each gender. So, we may assume that there
exists {c4, c5} ⊂ N3 ∩ S(µℓ) such that c4 ≻b2 c5. Evidently, c4 ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and c5 ̸= µˆ∗(b2) since
µˆ∗(b2) = c1 ∈ T (µℓ). Furthermore, we can choose a4 ∈ N1 ∩ S(µℓ) such that a4 ̸= µˆ∗(c4). Evidently,
b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a4) since b2 = µˆ∗(a1).
We note that (a1, b2, c5) is a blocking triplet for µℓ since b2 ≻a1 µℓ(a1), and b2 and c5 are single at
µℓ. We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c5) for µℓ.
We next note that (a4, b2, c4) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1 since c4 ≻b2 c5 = µℓ+1(b2), and a4 and
c4 are single at µℓ+1. We obtain another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a4, b2, c4)
for µℓ+1.
Considering the fact that Nˆ = S(µℓ+2) ∪ {a4, b2, c4} and b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a4) and c4 ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a4 ̸=
µˆ∗(c4), we can apply the same argument to the matching µℓ+2 as the one applied to the matching µℓ
in case 9–2.
Eventually, at the end of case 9–4, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings
mentioned in the theorem.
Case 9–5. Cases 9–1 and 9–2 do not apply, but the following conditions hold: b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a1) and
there exists c′ ∈ S(µℓ) such that c′ ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c′).
We note that (a1, b2, c
′) is a blocking triplet for µℓ since b2 ≻a1 µℓ(a1), and b2 and c′ are single at
µℓ. We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c
′) for µℓ.
Considering the fact that Nˆ = S(µℓ+1)∪{a1, b2, c′} and b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a1) and c′ ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c′),
we can apply the same argument to the matching µℓ+1 as the one applied to the matching µℓ in case 9–2.
Eventually, at the end of case 9–5, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings
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mentioned in the theorem.
Case 9–6. Cases 9–1 and 9–2 do not apply, but the following conditions hold: b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a1) and
there does not exist c′ ∈ S(µℓ) such that c′ ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c′).
Since |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6 and there does not exist c′ ∈ S(µℓ) such that c′ ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c′), it must
be the case that N3∩S(µℓ) = {c6, c7} for some (c6, c7) such that c6 = µˆ∗(b2) and a1 = µˆ∗(c7). We note
that c6 ̸= c7 because, if c6 = c7, we have µˆ∗(a1) = µˆ∗(µˆ∗(c7)) = µˆ∗(µˆ∗(c6)) = µˆ∗(µˆ∗(µˆ∗(b2))) = b2,
which is in contradiction with the assumption b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a1) in case 9–6. Since c6 ̸= c7, we have
c7 ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c6). We consider the following two subcases.
Subcase 9–6–1. We have c6 ≻b2 c7.
We choose a5 ∈ N1 ∩ Nˆ such that a5 = µˆ∗(c6). Since a1 ̸= µˆ∗(c6), we have a5 ̸= a1. Furthermore,
since Nˆ = S(µℓ) ∪ {a1, b1, c1} and a5 ̸= a1, we have a5 ∈ S(µℓ).
We note that (a1, b2, c7) is a blocking triplet for µℓ since b2 ≻a1 µℓ(a1), and b2 and c7 are single at
µℓ. We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c7) for µℓ.
We next note that (a5, b2, c6) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1 since c6 ≻b2 c7 = µℓ+1(b2), and a5 and
c6 are single at µℓ+1. We obtain another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a5, b2, c6)
for µℓ+1.
Considering the fact that Nˆ = S(µℓ+2)∪{a5, b2, c6} and (a5, b2, c6) ∈ µˆ∗, we can apply the same ar-
gument to the matching µℓ+2 as the one applied to the matching µℓ in case 9–1. That is, we may assume
that (a5, b2, c6) = (aˆ1, bˆ1, cˆ1) without loss, and we obtain a sequence of matchings µℓ+2, . . . , µℓ+|Nˆ|/3+1,
where µℓ+|Nˆ|/3+1 is stable.
Hence, at the end of subcase 9–6–1, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings
mentioned in the theorem.
Subcase 9–6–2. We have c7 ≻b2 c6.
Since |S(µℓ)| ≥ 6, at least two agents are single in each gender. So, we can choose a6 ∈ N1 ∩ S(µℓ)
such that b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a6). Evidently, a6 ̸= µˆ∗(c7) since µˆ∗(c7) = a1 ∈ T (µℓ).
We note that (a1, b2, c6) is a blocking triplet for µℓ since b2 ≻a1 µℓ(a1), and b2 and c6 are single at
µℓ. We now obtain another matching µℓ+1 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a1, b2, c6) for µℓ.
We next note that (a6, b2, c7) is a blocking triplet for µℓ+1 since c7 ≻b2 c6 = µℓ+1(b2), and a6 and
c7 are single at µℓ+1. We obtain another matching µℓ+2 by satisfying the blocking triplet (a6, b2, c7)
for µℓ+1.
Considering the fact that Nˆ = S(µℓ+2) ∪ {a6, b2, c7} together with the fact that b2 ̸= µˆ∗(a6) and
c7 ̸= µˆ∗(b2) and a6 ̸= µˆ∗(c7), we can apply the same argument to the matching µℓ+2 as the one applied
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to the matching µℓ in case 9–2.
Eventually, at the end of subcase 9–6–2, we obtain a stable matching in the sequence of matchings
mentioned in the theorem.
We summarize the algorithm in our proof. Our process starts with an arbitrary unstable matching,
and ends with a stable matching in step 1, 5, 6, or 9. In other steps such as steps 3, 4, 7, and 8,
we obtain another unstable matching with the smaller number of matched agents than before, and we
return to step 2. The loop starting in step 2 is not infinite because the number of agents is finite. Our
process exits from the loop at some point and ends in step 5, 6, or 9.
Our approach toward the construction of a sequence of matchings in the proof could be called as a
scrap-and-build approach. In the loop, we prompt matched agents to break bonds and become single.
After we increase the number of single agents as much as possible, we prompt single agents to get
matched in order to form a stable matching.
We finally state the following corollary as Roth and Vande Vate [1990] have established for two-sided
matching problems.
Corollary 1. Let µ1 be an arbitrary unstable matching for a three-sided cyclic matching problem,
which is specified by (N, (a)a∈N ) with N ≡ N1 ∪N2 ∪N3 and |Nn| = |N |/3 for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Suppose
that for any N¯1 ⊂ N1, N¯2 ⊂ N2, and N¯3 ⊂ N3 with |N¯1| = |N¯2| = |N¯3|, there exists a stable matching
for the problem (N¯ , (a)a∈N¯ ) with N¯ ≡ N¯1∪N¯2∪N¯3. Consider a random sequence R(µ1) = (µ1, µ2, . . .)
where each µℓ+1 is obtained from µℓ by satisfying a blocking triplet that is chosen at random from the
blocking triplets for µℓ. If the probability that each blocking triplet for µℓ will be chosen is positive and
bounded away from zero, then R(µ1) converges to a stable matching with probability one.
4. Conclusion
In the present paper, we have obtained the following result: for a three-sided cyclic matching problem
(N, (a)a∈N ) with N ≡ N1 ∪ N2 ∪ N3 and |Nn| = |N |/3 for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if a stable matching exists
for the problem itself and for any problem (N¯ , (a)a∈N¯ ) constructed of N¯ ≡ N¯1 ∪ N¯2 ∪ N¯3 with
N¯n ⊂ Nn and |N¯n| = |N¯ |/3 for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists a finite sequence of successive blockings from
an arbitrary unstable matching to a stable matching.
To prove the result, we have used the fact that the problem (N, (a)a∈N ) has a stable matching
in step 1. We have also used the fact that the problem (S(µℓ), (a)a∈S(µℓ)) has a stable matching in
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step 6 and the fact that the problem (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ) has a stable matching in step 9. We recall that
S(µℓ)  N in step 6 and Nˆ ⊆ N in step 9.
Pashkovich and Poirrier [2018] and other pioneers showed that a stable matching exists for the case
|Nn| ≤ 5. When |Nn| = |N |/3 ≤ 5, we have |S(µℓ)|/3 ≤ 4 in step 6 and |Nˆ |/3 ≤ 5 in step 9, and
hence each of the problems, (N, (a)a∈N ) in step 1, (S(µℓ), (a)a∈S(µℓ)) in step 6, and (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ )
in step 9, has a stable matching. Thus, we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Consider any three-sided cyclic matching problem with |Nn| ≤ 5. Starting from an
arbitrary unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive blockings leading to a stable
matching.
Lam and Plaxton [2019] showed that a stable matching does not necessarily exist for the case
|Nn| = 6 by utilizing the example presented by Biro and McDermid [2010]. When |Nn| = |N |/3 = 6,
we have |S(µℓ)|/3 ≤ 5 in step 6, and hence the problem (S(µℓ), (a)a∈S(µℓ)) in step 6 has a stable
matching. The problem (Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ) in step 9 has a stable matching if |Nˆ |/3 ≤ 5, but it may or may
not have a stable matching if |Nˆ |/3 = 6. However, if we assume the existence of a stable matching for
the problem (N, (a)a∈N ) when |Nn| = |N |/3 = 6, the existence of a stable matching for the problem
(Nˆ , (a)a∈Nˆ ) in step 9 is guaranteed since both of the problems are identical if |Nˆ |/3 = 6. Thus, we
can state the following.
Corollary 3. Consider any three-sided cyclic matching problem with |Nn| = 6 for which a stable
matching exists. Starting from an arbitrary unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive
blockings leading to a stable matching.
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